SCLC SEEKS POST- CONVICTION RELIEF
Brady and Giglio violation
- (1) The government has an obligation under Brady v. Maryland to provide exculpatory evidence to a criminal defendant. To establish a Brady violation, the evidence must be (1) favorable to the accused because it is either exculpatory or impeachment material; (2) suppressed by the government, either willfully or inadvertently: and (3) material or prejudicial. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1052-53 (9th Cir. 2002) the government has a duty to disclose Brady material even in the absence of a request by the defense. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995). For purposes of Brady, materiality is measured “in terms of suppressed evidence considered collectively, not item by item.” Id. At 436. That is, the reviewing court should assess the “cumulative effect” of the suppressed evidence Id. At 421.
- (2) Impeachment evidence is exculpatory evidence within meaning of Brady. See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). Brady/Giglio information includes “material…that bears on the credibility of a significant witness in the case.” United States v. Brimel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452, 1461 (9th Cir. 1993), amending 976 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original). Impeachment evidence is favorable Brady/Giglio material “when the reliability of the witness may be determinative of a criminal defendant’s guilt or innocence.” Id. At 1458 (citing Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154); see also United States v. Serv. Deli inc., 151 F.3d 938, 943 (9th Cir. 1998).
- (3) “Because the prosecution is in a unique position to obtain information known to other agents of the government, it may not be excused from disclosing what it does not know but could have learned.”
Fla. App 2 Dist 1968
Willful use of false testimony upon matters from state witnesses by public prosecutors to be perjured testimony is ground for post-conviction relief. 33 West F.S.A. Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule 1.850
Fla. App 3 Dist 1979
34 West’s F.S.A. Rules of Criminal Procedure, rule3.850 Hernandez v. State 368 So. 2d 606
Fla. 1970
Perjury of a witness in a criminal trial does not form basis of post-conviction relief unless prosecuting attorney knew at time such testimony was used that it was untrue. Fuller v. Wainwright 238 So. 2d 65
Fla. App 1 Dist. 1984
Willful use of false testimony upon material matters from prosecution witnesses where prosecutor knows that testimony is perjured warrants post-conviction relief.
West’s F.S.A. RCrp, Rule 3.850
Monson v. State. 443 So. 2d 106.1
Fla. Dist. 1983
Willful use of false testimony upon material matters from state witnesses by prosecutor, known by prosecutors to be perjured testimony, is recognized ground for relief from judgment.
West F.S.A. RCrp Rule 3.850
Porterfield v. State 442 So. 2d 1062, Appeal after remand
472 So. 2d 882 Defendant is entitled to relief from judgment when state, although not soliciting false evidence, allows false evidence to go uncorrected when false evidence appears.
Fla. App 4 Dist. 1970 Denson v. State 257 So. 2d 581
Allegation that prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony is sufficient to warrant relief on motion to vacate sentence.
33 F.S.A. RCrp 1.850
"Truth is on the side of the oppressed." -Malcolm X
Desmond Muhammad, President,
Dr. Juan P. Gray, Board Chairman
Jacksonville, Duval County
Chapter of The SCLC
904 316-2454